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In 2013, only seven months apart, the Appeals Chambers of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) pro-
nounced their judgments in the cases against Momčilo Perišić1 and Charles Taylor2, respec-
tively. Notably, the two Appeals Chambers applied diverging interpretations of the actus reus 
of aiding and abetting liability in international criminal law. 
 
Momčilo Perišić, former Chief of the General Staff in the Yugoslavian Army (VJ), was 
charged for his role in providing military and logistical assistance to the Army of the 
Republika Srpska (VRS)
3
. The ICTY Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber’s con-
viction of Perišić and acquitted him on the grounds that “specific direction”, as an element of 
the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability, was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
4
 
Charles Taylor, former president of Liberia, was charged on eleven counts and convicted by 
the SCSL Trial Chamber for aiding and abetting the crimes of the Revolutionary United 
Front/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (RUF/AFRC) in Sierra Leone. He had provided 
financial support, military training, personnel, arms and ammunition to the RUF/AFRC. The 
Appeals Chamber in Taylor confirmed the Trial Chamber Judgment, while explicitly rejecting 
that “specific direction” is a distinct element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.5  
 
The facts of the two cases are similar in two important aspects. Firstly, neither Perišić nor 
Taylor was a part of, or found to have had command responsibility over, the army/group that 
carried out the crimes in question. Secondly, neither of the accused was in geographical prox-
imity to the location where the crimes were committed. They were charged with aiding and 
abetting international crimes on the basis they had provided assistance from afar, to an ar-
my/group that later committed international crimes. The two judgments brought controversy 
and sparked debate
6
 amongst scholars of international criminal law on what the elements of 
aiding and abetting liability is, and what they normatively should be.  
 
This thesis will explore whether there is a requirement of “specific direction” in the actus reus 
of aiding and abetting liability in international criminal law, by analyzing the Perišić and Tay-
                                                 
1
  Perišić ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-04-81-A, 28 February 2013. 
2
  Taylor SCSL Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, 26 September 2013. 
3
  Perišić ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 2. 
4
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraphs 73-74. 
5
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraphs 481 and 539-540. 
6
  E.g. Stewart (2013), Ventura (2014) “Guest Post: Specific Direction à la Perišić, the Taylor Appeal Judg-




lor Judgments. As the ad hoc tribunals are in the process of finishing their last cases, the ques-
tion of what the elements of aiding and abetting liability are will eventually be left to the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) to decide. The Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute) Ar-
ticle 25(3)(c) on aiding and abetting liability has a slightly different formulation than the Stat-
utes of the ICTY/R and the SCSL. This may result in a somewhat different application of aid-
ing and abetting liability at the ICC. However, the issues raised in the Taylor and Perišić cas-
es should serve as important indicators that the ICC will have to clarify the range and ele-
ments of aiding and abetting liability. 
 
This became apparent in the 2014 Šainović et al. Judgment from the ICTY Appeals Chamber, 
when the “specific direction” requirement presented in the Perišić Appeal was repealed by the 
Chamber, again sparking the debate on the elements of aiding and abetting liability. As such, 
this thesis will end with an analysis of the issues that have been frequently debated in the pe-
riod following the Perišić and Taylor Judgments.  
 
1.1 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter two of the thesis will provide a brief presentation of aiding and abetting liability as a 
mode of individual criminal liability in international criminal law. There will be given a short 
introduction on the background of aiding and abetting as a mode of accomplice liability, fol-
lowed by a presentation of the relevant international legal instruments. In the final section of 
chapter two the elements of aiding and abetting will be presented as they were commonly 
applied preceding the Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment. Chapter three will present and 
discuss the Perišić and Taylor cases with regards to the elements of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity, especially the requirement of “specific direction”.  Chapter four of the thesis will present 
and analyze some of the frequently debated issues related to the question of “specific direc-
tion”. These issues are, the range of aiding and abetting liability, aiding and abetting liability 
when the accused is “remote” from the crime and finally a perspective on where aiding and 
abetting liability is heading. In the final chapter of this theses there will be set forth some con-
cluding remarks.  
 
1.2 Sources and Methodology 
International criminal law is a branch of public international law, and the sources of law are 
those of international law.
7
 One may therefore draw upon primary sources and secondary 
sources of law. Recognized sources of international law are stated in the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) Article 38. The Article states that the primary sources of inter-
national law are as follows: conventions, customs and general principles. The subsidiary 
                                                 
7
  Cassese et al. (2013) page 9. 
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sources are, according to the provision, judicial decisions and scholarly writings.
8
 The Stat-
utes of the ICTY/R and the SCSL does not have a provision on the sources of international 
criminal law, and are therefore obliged to use the sources as listed by the ICJ Statute.  
 
The Statute of the ICJ lists custom as a source of international law in Article 38 (1) (b).
 9
 Cus-
tomary international law is generally accepted as consisting of opinio juris and state practice. 
There are some inherent difficulties in establishing when an unwritten rule has developed into 
customary international law, and it has therefore been common at the international tribunals to 
refer to written documents and available evidence of state practice in order to show the exist-
ence of a rule of customary international law.
10
  The main indicator of customary international 
law in international criminal law is the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals 
(ICTs). 
                                                 
8
  ICJ Statute Article 38. 
9
  The Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Article 38 (1)(b) states that the Court shall apply “in-
ternational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”. The Statute of the ICJ is only binding 
for the Court itself, but has nevertheless become a point of reference when discussing customary internation-
al law, Sclütter (2010) page 2. 
10
  Cassese et al. (2011) page 5. 
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2 Aiding and abetting 
2.1 Individual criminal liability in international criminal law 
One may in part trace the origins of international criminal law, as we know it today, back to 
the late nineteenth century, and the international military prosecutions in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. Although, the reality is that the bulk of what we today think of as the 
rules of international criminal law has been developed during the past twenty years.
11
 In the 
aftermath of the Second World War new groups of crimes evolved and today it is generally 
accepted that international crimes include; war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and 




The codification of international criminal law started after the Second World War and has 
been a gradual process. Starting with the Genocide Convention in 1948, followed by the Ge-
neva Conventions with additional protocols adopted in 1949 and 1977. The 1990s saw the 
establishment of the first international ad hoc tribunals and in 2002 the International Criminal 
Court was established.
13
 The Nurnberg Trials, following the Second World War, were 
groundbreaking in international criminal law because they recognized the principle of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for international crimes. The trials were also groundbreaking in 
the sense that they placed responsibility with government officials and political leaders, peo-
ple who up to this point largely had been exempt from international criminal prosecution.
14
 
The statement from Nuremberg that “crimes against international law are committed by men, 
not by abstract legal entities”,15 shows how the perspective on individual criminal liability 
came to be viewed in the post-Second World War trials, and is at the core of international 
criminal law today.  
 
The characteristics of international criminal law as a system of law differ a great deal from 
that of national criminal law systems. Operating without criminal law enforcement and within 
a system of international law, where the nation state is the dominating entity, creates different 
challenges than we encounter within a national criminal law system. The system is also large-
                                                 
11
  Hayes et al. (2013) page 1. 
12
  Cassese et al. (2013), Chapters 4-7. 
It may be disputed whether or not the crime of aggression is generally accepted as an international crime. 
Cassese states that aggression “has not been adjudicated as [a] stand-alone crime […]”(Cassese et al. (2013) 
page 131), but the crime of aggression was included in Article 5 of the Rome Statute when it was adopted in 
1998 under the precondition that the court would not be able to exercise jurisdiction over this crime until a 
provision defining the crime of aggression was adopted. This was done in the 2010 ICC Review Conference 
in Kampala where Article 8bis of the Rome Statute was adopted (Cassese et al. (2013) pages 131-138). 
13
  Sliedregt (2012) page 5. 
14
  Sliedregt (2012) page 4. 
15
  Judgment of 1 October 1946, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg 1947 available in American Journal of International Law 41, page 221. 
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ly fragmented because, prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute
16
 and the creation of the 
ICC
17
, there was no general authority in international criminal law. The ad hoc tribunals are 
not bound by the decisions of other tribunals, only by their separate Statutes and customary 
international law. These distinctive characteristics of international criminal law have led to the 
development of rules in “bits and pieces through different experiences which may or may not 
be linked to one another”18. 
 
The distinctiveness of the crimes in international criminal law is described in one of the early 
cases at the ICTY Appeals Chamber, the Tadić case:  
 
“Most of the time these crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of single indi-
viduals but constitute manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes are often car-
ried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a common criminal design. Alt-
hough only some members of the group may physically perpetrate the criminal act 
(murder, extermination, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, etc.), the partic-
ipation and contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in facilitating 
the commission of the offence in question. It follows that the moral gravity of such par-
ticipation is often no less – or indeed no different – from that of those actually carrying 
out the acts in question.”19 
 
As the quote from the Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment indicates, large-scale wars and con-
flicts often leave in their aftermath, a large number of possible perpetrators of the crimes 
committed during these conflicts. The physical perpetrators of international crimes are not 
necessarily the only ones liable, or the ones who are the most responsible for the crimes. 
There are often a number of people who can be regarded as responsible for the perpetration of 
international crimes, without having physically participated in the commission of the crimes. 
This is due to the nature of the international crimes themselves. They are often manifestations 
of collective criminality. The crimes prosecuted in international criminal law are seldom per-
petrated by one person, but rather by a group of people, often contributing in different ways to 
the perpetration of the crime. The perpetrators operate within a social structure and this dy-
namic influences their conduct.
20
 There may be one intellectual author of the crime, while 
another is the physical perpetrator. One can also distinguish between principal perpetrators of 
the crime and accessories to the crime. Modes of collective and accessorial crimes are there-
                                                 
16
  17 July 1998. 
17
  1 July 2002. 
18
  Bassiouni (2013) page 28. 
19
  Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 191. 
20
  Jain (2014) page 3. 
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fore not the exception as it often is in national systems, but rather the norm in international 
criminal law. This has lead to the broadening of the understanding of the term “perpetration” 
in international criminal law to include “intellectual perpetration” (premised on the concept of 





is shown in practice by the application and development of liability modes such as joint crim-
inal enterprise (JCE)
23
 and indirect perpetration
24
. As will be shown, aiding and abetting lia-
bility can have an important function in connecting the assistance of an aider and abettor to 
the acts of the physical perpetrator of a crime because of the lower mens rea requirements for 
aiding and abetting. 
 
There are different models of applying criminal responsibility in different national criminal 
systems. The two dominating models are the unitary model and the differentiated model of 
criminal responsibility. The unitary model prescribe that all those who are found to have par-
ticipated in the criminal conduct are regarded as having committed the crime. However, the 
dominating model for application of individual criminal responsibility in international crimi-
nal law, generally accepted by international criminal tribunals (ICTs) and the ICC, is the dif-
ferentiated model. According to the differentiated model, judges are required to establish the 
mode of participation applicable in order to hold an individual criminally responsible.
25
 For-
mally, having to identify the mode of criminal responsibility does not have any significant 
consequences. International criminal law treaties and case law does not make any distinction 
between the different modes of liability when it comes to sentencing. However, there is evi-
dence to suggest that aiding and abetting liability is considered to be a lesser form of culpabil-
ity by ICTs than other liability modes and that there is a de facto mitigation principle that ap-




Criminal investigations and the gathering of evidence is also a challenge in international crim-
inal law. As the tribunals and courts operate within a system lacking any criminal law en-
forcement equal to enforcement mechanisms found in most national criminal systems, there 
are serious challenges, both as to apprehending indictees and in collecting evidence. Further-
more, the evidence connecting the indicted to the crime may be scarce in the first place, if the 
indicted was not the physical perpetrator of the crime. The evidence required in order to prove 
                                                 
21
  The ICTY Appeals Chamber has stated that “moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration 
of the crime” may constitute aiding and abetting, Furundžija Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 235. 
22
  Sliedregt (2012) page 19. 
23
  Primarily established and developed at the ICTY, in the Tadić Appeal Judgment. 
24
  The ICC has interpreted Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute to also include indirect perpetration. 
25
  Cassese et al. (2011) page 324. 
26
  Sliedregt (2012) pages 78-79. 
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intent, which is the most common mens rea requirement for criminal liability in international 
criminal law, can be difficult to produce in some cases. For example in cases where the ac-
cused did not take part in the physical perpetration of the crime, and was remote from the 
crime, either in a temporal or in a geographical sense.  
 
Aiding and abetting liability, which is one of the most limited forms of criminal responsibility 
in international criminal law, can therefore be an important mode of criminal liability due to 
the lower requirements when it comes to the mens rea and the actus reus for aiding and abet-
ting.  
 
2.2 Aiding and abetting in international criminal law 
Black’s Law Dictionary describes aiding and abetting in the following manner:  
 
“To assist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or to promote its accomplish-
ment”.27  
 
Aiding and abetting is a mode of individual criminal liability applied in international criminal 
law. It is a form of accessory liability, where the accused is held responsible for aiding or 
abetting a crime committed by a principal perpetrator. Aiding and abetting liability may have 
different functions as a mode of liability, applicable in different situations, as will be shown. 
 
As discussed, the crimes tried in cases of international criminal law, are often of such a char-
acter that the persons accused of being responsible are not necessarily the physical perpetra-
tors of the crimes at hand. There may not always be a common plan behind the perpetration of 
a crime, a precondition for the application of modes of liability based on a participation in a 
common purpose or plan.
28
 Aiding and abetting, not requiring criminal intent, only knowledge 
that the act or omission assists the principal perpetrator, may therefore be a more apt mode of 
criminal liability to apply to these cases. As such, aiding and abetting is probably the most 
commonly applied mode of accessory liability in international criminal law today
29
 and may 
be applicable in several different types of cases. By applying aiding and abetting liability, 
prosecutors may be able to target those who have contributed to the crime in smaller, but es-
sential ways, although not acted as the principal perpetrator of the crime; these can be de-
scribed as intermediary criminals.
30
 Another important use of aiding and abetting liability is in 
                                                 
27
  Black’s Law Dictionary (2009) page 81. 
28
  E.g. Joint Criminal Enterprise. 
29
  ICTY Statute Article 7(1), ICTR Statute 6(1), Law on the ECCC Article 29, SCSL Statute Article 6(1), 
Rome Statute Article 25(3)(c).  
30
  Cassese et al. (2011) page 381. 
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cases where political or military leaders give their approval or encouragement or otherwise 
aid or abet the crime without being the author of the crime as such. Last, aiding and abetting 
liability may have the function of filling evidentiary gaps in a case.
31
 Sometimes the evidence 
at hand cannot support a more comprehensive charge than aiding and abetting.   
 
The different modes of criminal liability in international criminal law are usually more or less 






Some modes of criminal liability applied in international criminal law are to a large extent 
based on municipal law, aiding and abetting being one of these.
33
 Anglo-American law has 
been the main source of inspiration for international treaties of international criminal law that 
includes aiding and abetting liability.
34
 Anglo-American felony law used to differentiate be-
tween two different types of accessories or accomplices. Principals in the second degree (sec-





Due to this difference there were also different mens rea requirements for the two types of 
liability. Common law required a “purposive attitude” if you were an accessory before the 
fact, but if you were a secondary principal, “knowledge” was sufficient. The reasoning behind 
the differentiation of the two modes of secondary perpetration was that the accessory was 
considered less involved in perpetrating the crime, and thus less to blame than the secondary 
principal.
36
 The distinction came about because there was concern that the death penalty 
should not necessarily be imposed on all accomplices to a felony.
37
 The temporal and physical 
proximity to the crime was viewed as to make the secondary principal more blameworthy 
than the accessory. After legislative reform, these two forms of accomplice liability were 
joined together under the term “aider and abettor”.38   
 
                                                 
31
  Cassese et al. (2011) page 381 
32
  Sliedregt (2012) page 89 
33
  Sliedregt (2012) page 89 
34
  Sliedregt (2012) page 112 
35
  Sliedregt (2012) page 112 
36
  Sliedregt (2012) page 114 
37
  Sliedregt (2012) page 112 
38
 Sliedregt (2012) page113 
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2.2.2 Aiding and abetting/Accessorial liability in international legal instruments 
Antonio Cassese describes aiding and abetting as “giving practical assistance, encouragement, 
or moral support with knowledge that it assists the perpetrator in the commission of the 
crime”,39 and furthermore that the assistance given “must have a substantial effect on the per-
petration of the crime”.40 This is a definition that has crystallized over time through applica-
tion of an accessory mode of criminal liability in jurisprudence in international criminal law 




All the ad hoc international criminal tribunals have provisions setting out the modes of indi-
vidual criminal liability applicable under their statutes. However, none of these provisions 
codify the objective or mental elements necessary to be held liable according to the different 
liability modes.
42
 As will be shown, the Rome Statute
43
 is the only Statute in international 
criminal law codifying the mental element required, in order to apply individual criminal re-
sponsibility.  
 
2.2.2.1 Statutes of ad hoc international criminal tribunals and mixed courts 
The Statutes of the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
SCSL are identical when it comes to the provisions setting out the scope of individual crimi-
nal liability. Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute and Article 
6(1) of the SCSL Statute states that: 
 
“A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted 
in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5
44
 of the 
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.” 
 
The Law on the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has a similar 
formulation of the individual criminal responsibility at the Courts.
45
 The Statute of the Special 
                                                 
39
  Cassese et al. (2013) page 193. 
40
  Cassese et al. (2013) page 193. 
41
 This exact definition has been broadly accepted and applied at the ICTY and the ICTR.  
42
  ICTY Statute Article 7, ICTR Statute Article 6, SCSL Statute Article 6, Law on the ECCC Article 29, STL 
Statute Article 3. 
43
  Rome Statute Article 30. 
44
  In the Statute for the SCSL the Article applies to Articles 2 to 4. The Statute for the SCSL does not include a 
provision on the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity, while instead including “Other serious vio-
lations of international humanitarian law” (SCSL Article 4). In the ICTR the Article also applies to Articles 
2 to 4, the Statute does not include an Article on the violations of the laws or customs of war. 
45
  The Law on the ECCC Article 29 states: “Any suspect who planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, 
or committed the crimes referred to in article 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law shall be individually respon-
sible for the crime. 
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Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) states that “[a] person shall be individually responsible for crimes 
[…] if that person: a. [c]ommitted, participated as accomplice, organized or directed others to 
commit the crimes”.46  
 
As will be shown, one has to look to the jurisprudence of the tribunals in order to determine 
the elements of aiding and abetting liability in customary international law. 
  
2.2.2.2 The Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 25(3)(c) states that a person can 
be held criminally responsible and liable for punishment if that person:  
 
“In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be held criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person […] (c) For 
the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise as-
sists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for 
its commission”. 
 
It has been suggested by legal scholars
47
 that the language of this provision may be interpreted 
as introducing an additional requirement for aiding and abetting liability. Namely, that the 
aider and abettor assists the perpetrator “for the purpose of facilitating [the] crime”. This 
would narrow the scope of aiding and abetting liability. To date, the ICC has not yet applied 
aiding and abetting liability in any of its cases, and this issue will therefore not be settled until 
such time. 
 
2.2.3 The elements of aiding and abetting 
Individual criminal responsibility based on an act or omission that aids or abets an interna-
tional crime was established as customary international law in the post Second World War 
trials
48
 and in more recent times, first confirmed by the ICTY Trial Chamber and Appeals 
Chamber in the first case before the tribunal, namely the Tadić case.49 As none of the ad hoc 
                                                 
46
  Statute of the STL Article 3(1)(a). 
47
  E.g. Cassese et al. (2013) page 195 and Sliedregt (2011) page 237. 
48
  E.g. The Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, (Zyklon B case) in which two German industrialists were 
convicted of being accessories to the murder of interred allied civilians by supplying the lethal gas Zyklon B 
to concentrations camps run by the SS.    
49
  The ICTY Trial Chamber established in the Tadić Judgment that individual criminal liability for aiding and 
abetting is customary international law, which was necessary in order for the Tribunal to apply this form of 
individual criminal liability on those indicted to the ICTY. Article 4 (1) of  The Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and Article III of the International Con-
vention on the Suppression and Punishment of the crime of Apartheid is used as evidence of the existence of 




tribunals’ Statutes specifies the elements required for aiding and abetting liability, the concept 
of aiding and abetting liability has been further developed through case law, primarily the 
case law of the ICTY and the ICTR. 
 
2.2.3.1 The mental element – Mens rea 
The mental element of a crime, or the mens rea, refers to the state of mind the accused is re-
quired to hold when committing the criminal act in order for liability to arise.
50
 The challenge 
in international criminal law is that there are no substantive
51
 or customary rules setting out a 
general definition of the different categories of mens rea.
52
The different categories of mens 
rea requirements have therefore been elaborated on in the post-WWII trials and by the ad hoc 
tribunals starting in the 1990s.  
 
As mentioned, the Statute of the ICTY/R does not have a general provision defining the mens 
rea, and therefore not a provision defining the mens rea of aiding and abetting liability. At the 
ICTY/R the mens rea requirements for different modes of liability have been defined in rela-
tion to specific cases at the tribunals. As a consequence of this practice, there is no general 
finding on the mens rea, which means that you have to examine the case law relevant for the 
specific liability, in order to determine the applicable mens rea requirements.
53
   
 
The case law of the tribunals clarifies and defines the subjective element of aiding and abet-
ting as:  
 
“[t]he mens rea required for aiding and abetting is that the accused knew that his acts 
would assist the commission of the crime by the perpetrator or that he was aware of the 
substantial likelihood that his acts would assist the commission of a crime by the perpe-
trator”54 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
constitutes complicity or participation” punishable under the Convention and the Convention on Apartheid 
hold those responsible who “participate in, directly incite, or conspire in [,or]…[d]irectly abet, encourage or 
cooperate in the commission of the crime”.  The Tribunal goes on to analyze jurisprudence from the Post-
World War II period and looks to the Trial of Wagner and Six Others and the Tadić Trial Chamber Judg-
ment paragraphs 664-669. 
50
  Cassese et al. (2013) page 39. 
51
  An exception to this is the ICC Statute Article 30. 
52
  Cassese et al. (2013) pages 39-40. 
53
  Sliedregt (2012) page 50. 
54
 Brima et al. Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 776. 
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In other words, the aider and abettor needs to have knowledge that “his actions assist the per-
petrator in the commission of the crime”55. While the aider and abettor does not need to share 
the principal perpetrator’s intent, he needs to have knowledge of the “essential elements of the 
crime which was ultimately committed by the principal”56 and he needs to have knowledge of 
the principal perpetrators intent and special intent if so required. For example, if a person is 
aiding and abetting the crime of genocide he needs to know that his actions assist in the perpe-
tration of the genocide, have knowledge of the essential elements of the crime, and be aware 
of the principal perpetrators genocidal intent. He does not need to possess genocidal intent 
himself.
57
 The mental element of aiding and abetting liability is especially important because 




The Rome Statute is an exemption from the lack of general provisions of mens rea in interna-
tional legal instruments. Article 30 of the Rome Statute codifies the mental element required 
for individual criminal responsibility. The Article states that: “[u]nless otherwise provided, a 
person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime […] only if the 
material elements are committed with intent and knowledge”59. The Article defines “intent” as 
deliberate conduct or acting with the purpose of causing the occurred consequence or aware-
ness that the consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.
60
 Article 30(3) defines 
“knowledge” as “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the or-
dinary course of events”.61  
 
2.2.3.2 The objective element – Actus reus 
The objective element of aiding and abetting international crimes focuses on the consequenc-
es of a person’s acts or omissions. The act or omission does not have to be illegal or criminal 
in itself, it is the fact that it assists the principal perpetrator in the commission of the crime 
that makes the aider and abettor liable, given that the mens rea requirement is also met. The 
assistance given may be of a physical nature, but can also be solely psychological in charac-




                                                 
55
  Cassese et al. (2013) pages 193-194. 
56
  Simić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 86. 
57
  Cassese et al. (2013) page 194. 
58
  Cassese et al. (2013) page 194. 
59
  Rome Statute Article 30(1). 
60
  Rome Statute Article 30(2). 
61
  Rome Statute Article 30(3). 
62
  Cassese et al. (2013) page 193. 
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In the jurisprudence from the ad hoc tribunals established in the 1990s and onwards, the con-
cept of aiding and abetting liability has crystallized. The generally accepted description of the 
actus reus is that the objective element of aiding and abetting liability consists of giving 
“practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of the crime”.63 As mentioned this was the generally accepted understanding of 
the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting liability until recently. In the following sec-
tion we will now move on to analyze the Perišić and the Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgments 
from 2013. In an attempt to assess what significance these judgments have for the understand-
ing of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability in international criminal law.  
 
                                                 
63
  Furundžija Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 249. 
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3 Aiding and abetting in the cases of Perišić and Taylor 
In 2013, within seven months of each other, the ICTY Appeals Chamber and the SCSL Ap-
peals Chamber pronounced their judgments in the cases against Momčilo Perišić64 and 
Charles Taylor
65, respectively. Perišić was charged for his role in providing military and lo-
gistical assistance from the Yugoslavian Army (VJ) to the Army of Republika Srpska. Taylor 
was charged with eleven counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity
66
. He was found 
guilty by the SCSL Trial Chamber of aiding and abetting the crimes of the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone by providing financial support, military training, person-




The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Perišić unexpectedly applied a discrete “specific direction” 
requirement for the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability. The SCSL Appeals Chamber 
subsequently discussed the requirement in Taylor, and concluded that “specific direction” was 
not an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability under the SCSL Statute or 
customary international law.
68
 The ICTY Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber’s 
judgment and acquitted Perišić, while the SCSL Appeals Chamber confirmed the Trial Cham-
ber’s conviction in the Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment.  
 
The Perišić Appeal Judgment brought controversy by, in some people’s opinion69, setting 
aside a well established understanding of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability in in-
ternational criminal law and introducing “a ‘new’ element to the doctrine of aiding and abet-
ting”.70 The Appeals Chamber in Perišić asserted that there is an explicit requirement of spe-
cific direction when applying aiding and abetting liability in cases of remote conduct
71
, a posi-
tion that took many by surprise.  
 
The controversy following the Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment continued when the SCSL 
Appeals Chamber in Taylor, only seven months later rejected the notion of a discrete re-
                                                 
64
  Perišić ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-04-81-A, 28 February 2013. 
65
  Taylor SCSL Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, 26 September 2013. 
66
   Taylor Indictment, SCSL-03-01-I, 7 March 2003. 
67
  Taylor Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 6953. 
68
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 481. 
69
  See for example: Stewart (2013), “The ICTY loses its way on complicity – Part 1” 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/03/guest-post-the-icty-loses-its-way-on-complicity-part-1/ . 
70
  Knoops (2014) pages 104-105. 
71
  The question of when an accused aider and abettor is remote from the crimes in question “will depend on the 
individual circumstances of each case” according to the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Perišić. The Appeals 
Chamber mentions temporal and geographic distance as examples of such remoteness, but does not elaborate 
further on this (Perišić Appeal Chamber Judgment, paragraph 40).  
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quirement of “specific direction”. The SCSL Appeals Chamber held that customary interna-
tional law did not prescribe a discrete requirement of “specific direction”, and that “specific 
direction” generally is not an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability.72 
 
3.1 Perišić – Trial Chamber Judgment 
Momčilo Perišić was Chief of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) General Staff from 26 August 1993, 
making him the most senior officer
73
 in the VJ. Perišić was initially indicted on 22 February 
2005
74
 and charged on 13 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
75
 He was found 
guilty by the Trial Chamber, Judge Moloto dissenting, as an aider and abettor of crimes
76
 that 
took place in Sarajevo and Srebrenica during the war in Bosnia. Perišić subsequently appealed 
the judgment, challenging his convictions and sentence, and the case was brought before the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber.   
 
The Trial Chamber in Perišić had defined the actus reus of aiding and abetting and held that 
“[t]he Appeals Chamber expressly stated that “specific direction” is not a requisite element of 
the actus reus of aiding and abetting”77, citing both the Mrkšić and Šljivančanin78 and 
Blagojević and Jokić79 Judgments. There is no further mention of “specific direction” in the 
Perišić Trial Judgment by the Chamber.  Judge Moloto presents his dissenting opinion with 
regard to counts one to four and nine to twelve of the indictment.
80
 Judge Moloto disagreed 
with the majority’s conclusion that specific direction is not a requisite element of the actus 
reus of aiding and abetting, and stressed that “the notion of “specific direction” has been con-
sistently cited by [the] Tribunal”81 and that “in cases of remoteness, the notion of specific 
direction must form an integral and explicit component of the objective element of aiding and 
abetting.”82 Judge Moloto also presents the argument that “in cases of remoteness, the notion 
                                                 
72
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 481. 
73
  Perišić Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 3. 
74
  Perišić Indictment (Initial) IT-04-81-I, paragraph 5667. 
75
  Perišić Indictment (Initial) IT-04-81-I, paragraph 5667. 
76
  Perišić was found guilty of aiding and abetting: murder, inhumane acts (injuring and wounding civilians, 
inflicting serious injuries, wounding, forcible transfer), and persecutions as crimes against humanity; and 
murder and attacks on civilians as violations of the laws or customs of war, Perišić Appeals Chamber Judg-
ment, paragraph 4. 
77
  Perišić Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 126. 
78
  Perišić Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 126 citing Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgment paragraph 
159. 
79
  Perišić Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 126 citing Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment paragraphs 
182, 185-189. 
80
  Perišić Indictment (Initial) IT-04-81-I, paragraph 5667. 
81
  Perišić Trial Judgment, XII. Dissenting opinion of Judge Moloto on Counts 1 to 4 and 9 to 12, paragraph 9. 
82
  Perišić Trial Judgment, XII. Dissenting opinion of Judge Moloto on Counts 1 to 4 and 9 to 12, paragraph 10. 
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of specific direction must form an integral and explicit component of the objective element of 
aiding and abetting”. He held that Perišić was physically “remote” from the crime scene and 
because of this; “specific direction” had to be explicitly proved beyond reasonable doubt. 83 
 
3.2 Perišić – Appeals Chamber Judgment 
The Perišić Defence then seized on Judge Moloto’s dissenting opinion, and directed their se-
cond appeal ground to the Trial Chamber’s findings on aiding and abetting liability.84 They 
quoted parts of Judge Moloto’s dissenting opinion in the Trial Judgment and argued that 
“specific direction” is an integral part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting. The Defence 
also argued that the standard of aiding and abetting liability applied by the Trial Chamber, 
amounted to that of strict liability when not including the element of “specific direction”. On 
this background the Appeals Chamber discussed the requirement of “specific direction”. 
 
The Appeals Chamber heard the case and subsequently found in favor of the Defence, and 
overturned the Trial Chamber’s judgment. Perišić was acquitted of aiding and abetting the 
crimes of the VRS, with the Appeals Chamber concluding that “specific direction” was a nec-
essary element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting, based on the finding that “specific 
direction” had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.85 
 
3.2.1 Review of the case law on specific direction 
The Appeals Chamber in Perišić starts the analysis of the issue of “specific direction” by re-
viewing its own jurisprudence in order to establish whether “specific direction” is an element 
of aiding and abetting liability or not. They initially quote the Tadić Appeals Chamber Judg-
ment,
86
 which was the first ICTY Appeal Judgment to give an account of aiding and abetting 
liability. The actus reus described in Tadić:  
 
“The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend 
moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, 
rape, torture, wanton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a sub-
stantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime.”87 
 
                                                 
83
  Perišić Trial Judgment, XII. Dissenting opinion of Judge Moloto on Counts 1 to 4 and 9 to 12, paragraph 10, 
(emphasis in the original). 
84
  Perišić Appeal Brief, Public redacted version of the Appeal Brief of Momčilo Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A. 
85
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 73. 
86
  Tadić ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-94-A, 15 July 1999. 
87
  Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 229 (iii), (emphasis added). 
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The Appeals Chamber in Perišić contends that this definition has not been parted from “to 
date” and that this exact definition has been repeated in many Appeals Chamber Judgments, 
both at the ICTY and other ad hoc tribunals after Tadić.88 The Appeals Chamber in Perišić 
holds that the definition of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability set out in Tadić in-
cludes the element of “specific direction” which, depending on the circumstances, has to be 
proven either implicitly or explicitly.
89
   
 
In reviewing its own jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber finds that, while some judgments 
rendered after Tadić explicitly quote the Judgment or use equivalent language, there are some 
Appeals Chamber Judgments, both from the ICTY and the ICTR Appeals Chamber, that does 
not include any reference to “specific direction” or a reference to a corresponding requirement 
in the actus reus of aiding and abetting. The Appeals Chamber holds that this finding is not 
contrary to the notion that “specific direction” is an essential part of the actus reus of aiding 
and abetting. The Chamber justifies this position by arguing that those judgments,
90
 either 
does not provide a “comprehensive definition” of the elements of aiding and abetting liability, 
or do not set out “all the elements” of aiding and abetting liability, only focusing on other 




The only Appeals Chamber Judgment that supports a definition of the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting that does not refer to, or mention specific direction at all, is the Delalić et al. judg-
ment from 2001, according to the Appeals Chamber in Perišić.92 Without conducting an inde-
pendent analysis of Delalić, the Appeals Chamber interprets the judgment in light of the 2007 
Blagojević and Jokić judgment.93 In Blagojević and Jokić the Chamber address the fact that 
“specific direction” has not always been included as an element of the actus reus of aiding 
and abetting. It is stated that the Tadić definition of aiding and abetting liability has not been 
departed from, and that “specific direction” often will be implicit in the finding that the ac-
cused has provided practical assistance to the principal perpetrator which had a substantial 
effect on the commission of the crime, and therefore making it unnecessary to mention it ex-
                                                 
88
  Perišić Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 27. 
89
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 36. 
90
  In this regard the Appeals Chamber mentions in particular: Haradinaj et al., Limaj et al., Furundžija, 
Renzaho, Nchamihigo, Zigiranyirazo, Ndindabahizi, Gacumbitsi, Semanza and the Rutaganda Appeal 
Judgments as examples of judgments that does not contain language equivalent to specific direction, Perišić 
Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 30. 
91
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 30. 
92
  Delalić ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-A, 20 February 2001. 
93





 The Chamber finds that when Delalić is interpreted in this context, one must con-
clude that that the “specific direction” requirement was implicit also in Delalić.95 
 
The only ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment that explicitly refutes the existence of a discrete 
requirement of “specific direction” as a part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability 
is, according to the Appeals Chamber in Perišić, the Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judg-
ment from 2009.
96
 In this judgment the Appeals Chamber states that “the Appeals Chamber 
has confirmed that “specific direction” is not an essential ingredient of the actus reus of aid-
ing and abetting” 97, referring to the same paragraph in Blagojević and Jokić as the Chamber 
uses in Perišić. However, as mentioned above, the Perišić Appeals Chamber is using this par-
agraph to argue for the existence of a discrete “specific direction” requirement.  
 
This is in and of itself quite confusing, because the Appeals Chamber, in Mrkšić and 
Šljivančanin and in Perišić respectively, uses the same paragraph in Blagojević and Jokić to 
argue two diametrically opposed positions on the existence of a “specific direction” require-
ment. The confusion continues when the Appeals Chamber interprets the statement in Mrkšić 
and Šljivančanin, a statement which at the outset seems to directly contradict the notion of a 
“specific direction” requirement, in an unexpected manor. The Appeals Chamber, noting that 
the statement is made in a section regarding the mens rea, holds that the statement seems to 
lack the required “careful consideration” which is the settled practice at the Appeals Chamber 
when departing from previous decisions.
98
 This leads the Perišić Appeals Chamber to con-
clude that the statement in Mrkšić and Šljivančanin was only made as “an attempt to summa-
rise”99 Blagojević and Jokić, not as a departure from the definition set out in Tadić.100  The 
Appeals Chamber thus concludes, Judge Liu dissenting, that customary international law stip-
ulates that “no conviction for aiding and abetting may be entered if the element of specific 
direction is not established beyond reasonable doubt, either explicitly or implicitly”.101 
 
                                                 
94
  Blagojević and Jokić Appeals Chamber Judgment.  
95
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 31. 
96
  Mrkšić and Šljivančanin ICTYAppeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A. 
97
  Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 159. 
98
  The Appeals Chamber refers to Aleksovski (Appeals Chamber Judgment Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, 24 March 
2000) where the Appeals Chamber states that “[t]he Appeals Chamber will only depart from a previous deci-
sion after the most careful consideration has been given to it, both as to the law, including the authorities cit-
ed, and the facts” (Aleksovski para. 109). 
99
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 34. 
100
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 34. 
101
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 36. 
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3.2.2 Specific direction in cases of remoteness 
After concluding that “specific direction” is a part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting 
liability, the Appeals Chamber goes on to discuss circumstances in which “specific direction” 
must be explicitly considered. The Chamber states that in many instances, the proof of other 
elements of aiding and abetting liability may be sufficient to show “specific direction”, and 
that this may be the rationale explaining why some previous Appeals Chamber Judgments 
have not included a discussion of “specific direction”.102  This kind of self-evident or implicit 
“specific direction” is, according to the Perišić Appeals Chamber, possible in cases where the 
accused aider and abettor was proximate to the crime, geographically or otherwise.
103
 If the 
accused instead was remote from the crime, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, finds 
that explicit consideration of specific direction is required.
104
 The concept of remoteness is, as 
mentioned previously, first mentioned by Judge Moloto in his dissenting opinion
105
, and re-
peated by the Perišić Defence in the Appeal Brief.106  
 
Whether or not the accused is considered remote from the crimes depends on the “individual 
circumstances of each case”,107 according to the Chamber.  By referring to a previous find-
ing,
108
 that a significant temporal distance between the actions of the accused and the crime 
will decrease the likelihood of the necessary connection between the actions of the accused 











                                                 
102
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 38. 
103
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 38. 
104
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 39. 
105
  Perišić Trial Judgment, XII. Dissenting opinion of Judge Moloto on Counts 1 to 4 and 9 to 12, paragraph 10, 
(emphasis in the original). 
106
  Perišić Appeal Brief, paragraph 22. 
107
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 40 
108
  Kupreškić et al. Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraphs 275-277 (finding that a six-month delay between 
an appellant being observed unloading weapons and a subsequent attack reduced the likelihood that these 
weapons were directed towards assisting in this attack).  
109
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 40. 
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The Appeals Chamber’s findings on the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability may be 
summarized like this: 
 
The elements of aiding 
and abetting liability in 
Perišić 
When the aider and abettor is  
proximate to the crime 
When the aider and abettor is  
remote from the crime 
Actus reus Giving practical assistance, en-
couragement, or moral support 
that is specifically directed to the 
crime perpetrated by the princi-
pal perpetrator. The specific 
direction requirement may be 
proved either implicitly or ex-
plicitly. 
Giving practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral sup-
port that is specifically di-
rected to the crime perpetrated 
by the principal perpetrator. 
The specific direction re-
quirement has to be explicitly 
proved. 
Mens rea Knowledge that the act of the 
aider and abettor assists the per-
petrator in the commission of the 
crime and awareness of the es-
sential elements of the crime that 
was committed. 
Knowledge that the act of the 
aider and abettor assists the 
perpetrator in the commission 
of the crime and awareness of 
the essential elements of the 
crime that was committed. 
 
3.2.3 De novo review by the Appeals Chamber  
In order to determine whether or not the assistance provided by Perišić was specifically di-
rected towards the crimes of the VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica, the Appeals Chamber as-
sess the relevant evidence de novo.
110
 The Chamber conducts two inquiries they consider rel-
evant to the question of specific direction. First they set out to assess whether or not the 
VRS’s “sole and exclusive purpose was the commission of crimes”111, i.e. if the VRS was a 
“criminal organization”. If this was the case, it would suggest that all assistance to the VRS 
was specifically directed towards their crimes as well.
112
 The second inquiry of relevance to 
the question of specific direction was, whether or not the Supreme Defence Council of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SDC)
113
 endorsed a policy of assisting VRS crimes. A policy 
                                                 
110
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 45. 
111
  Perišić Appeal Chamber Judgment, paragraph 52. 
112
  Perišić Appeal Chamber Judgment, paragraph 52. 
113
  In the Perišić Trial Chamber Judgment the composition of the SDC is described: “According to the Consti-




of that nature would suggest that the assistance provided by the VJ to the VRS was specifical-




With regard to the first inquiry, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the activities of the VRS 
in Sarajevo and Srebrenica were not all of a criminal nature, and thus the VRS could not be 
labeled as a criminal organization. When it cames to the question of whether or not the SDC 
endorsed a policy of assisting VRS crimes the Chamber concluded, Judge Liu dissenting, that 





In addition to these two requirements the Appeals Chamber considered whether or not Perišić 
either implemented the SDC policy in a manner that redirected aid towards the VRS, or if he 
took actions, outside of his efforts to implement the SDC policy which might suggest that the 
aid he facilitated was specifically directed towards the crimes committed by the VRS in Sara-
jevo and Srebrenica.
116
The Chamber’s conclusion was that the manner in which Perišić pro-
vided the aid did not demonstrate specific direction, and that the evidence on record did not 
prove that Perišić took steps outside his directions from the SDC.117 The overall conclusion of 
the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, was that it was not proved beyond reasonable 
doubt that that the assistance provided by Perišić was specifically directed to the crimes of the 
VRS, overturning the Trial Chamber conviction. 
 
3.2.4 Separate opinions of Judge Ramaroson and Judges Meron and Agius 
Judge Ramaroson gave a separate opinion on the issue of “specific direction”. She stated that 
she agreed with the finding of the Appeal Judgment, but she disagreed with the majority’s 
contention that “specific direction” was an essential element of aiding and abetting liability 
and that it must be “analysed exclusively in the context of actus reus”118. In Judge 
Ramaroson’s opinion “the idea of specific direction is implicitly considered in mens rea”119. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. In practice, the SDC meetings were also attended by other high-level 
federal officials, such as the FRY Prime Minister, the FRY Minister of Defence, the Chief of the VJ General 
Staff and, occasionally, high-ranking military officers.”(Perišić, Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 198). 
114
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 52.  
115
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 58. 
116
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 59. 
117
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraphs 66-67. 
118
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, IX. Separate opinion of Judge Ramaroson on the issue of specific di-
rection relevant to aiding and abetting liability, paragraph 1-2. 
119
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, IX. Separate opinion of Judge Ramaroson on the issue of specific di-
rection relevant to aiding and abetting liability, paragraph 7. 
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Judges Maron and Agius gave a joint separate opinion.
120
 They stated that while they agreed 
with the analysis and conclusions of the majority, they wished to address the issue of whether 
specific direction should be considered as part of the actus reus or mens rea of aiding and 
abetting.
121
 They held that if the requirement of “specific direction” had not been included in 
the actus reus in the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s past jurisprudence, “we would consider cate-
gorising specific direction as an element of mens rea.”122 However, they accepted the Cham-
ber’s conclusion that “specific direction” is a part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting lia-




3.2.5 Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Liu 
Judge Liu partially dissented to the conclusions of the Appeals Chamber regarding the convic-
tions for aiding and abetting in Perišić.124 His main objection to the Chamber’s reasoning was 
that specific direction, according to him, had not been applied consistently, and therefore can-
not be said to amount to an essential element of aiding and abetting liability. Furthermore 
Judge Liu considered that, insisting on such a requirement would “raise the threshold for aid-
ing and abetting liability” to a level he felt might risk undermining the purpose of aiding and 
abetting liability.
125
   
 
As said, the Perišić Appeal Judgment was controversial when it was released 28 February 
2013. At this time the Appeals Chamber at the Special Court for Sierra Leone was working on 
the Charles Taylor Appeal Judgment. Given that Taylor had been convicted for aiding and 
abetting, experts now questioned whether or not the SCSL Appeals Chamber would be influ-
enced by the Perišić judgment and apply “specific direction” in the Taylor case.  
 
3.3 Taylor – Trial Chamber Judgment 
Following the acquittal of Perišić, and the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s position on “specific 
direction”, many awaited the Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment in suspense. The fact pattern 
in Taylor was very similar to that in Perišić and therefore it was a possibility that Taylor also 
                                                 
120
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, VII. Joint separate opinion of Judges Theodor Meron and Carmel 
Agius. 
121
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, VII. Joint separate opinion of Judges Theodor Meron and Carmel 
Agius, paragraph 1. 
122
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, VII. Joint separate opinion of Judges Theodor Meron and Carmel 
Agius, paragraph 4. 
123
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, VII. Joint separate opinion of Judges Theodor Meron and Carmel 
Agius, paragraph 4. 
124
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, VIII. Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Liu. 
125
  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, VIII. Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Liu, paragraph 3. 
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would be acquitted if the SCSL Appeals Chamber applied a discrete “specific direction” re-
quirement.  
 
Charles Taylor was the 22
nd
 President of Liberia from 1997 to 2003. He was indicted on 7 
March 2003 by the SCSL, and charged with eleven counts for crimes committed in Sierra 
Leone by the RUF/AFRC during the civil war. The indictment stated five counts for crimes 
against humanity, five for violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II of the 





On 18 May 2012, the SCSL Trial Chamber convicted Taylor on all eleven counts and held 
him criminally liable for aiding and abetting the commission of the crimes of the 
RUF/AFRC.
127
 The Trial Chamber in the Taylor Judgment had stated in its judgment that 
“[t]he actus reus of specific direction does not require ‘specific direction’” when establishing 
the applicable law of aiding and abetting.
128
 The Trial Chamber did not discuss the question 
of “specific direction” further than this.  
 
3.4 Taylor – Appeals Chamber Judgment 




. The Taylor 
Defence did not explicitly argue on appeal that the Trial Chamber’s rejection of the “specific 
direction” requirement was erroneous. However, the Appeals Chamber chose to address the 
question of “specific direction” on its own initiative.131 
 
3.4.1 Assistance to the “crime” 
The Appeals Chamber in Taylor discussed the law of individual criminal liability by address-
ing four challenges to the law that the Trial Chamber articulated and applied.  
 
The Chamber first set out to address Appeal Grounds number 21 and 34
132
. In these grounds, 
the Defence argued that the Trial Chamber erred “in law and fact in finding that any alleged 
                                                 
126
  Taylor Indictment, SCSL-03-01-I, 7 March 2003. 
127
  Taylor SCSL Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T. 
128
  Taylor Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 484. 
129
  Grounds numbers sixteen to thirty-four were related to Taylor’s liability for aiding and abetting, concerning 
both the actus reus and the mens rea of aiding and abetting. 
130
  Taylor Defence Appeal Brief. 
131
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 471. 
132
  Ground 34 was later removed as it is not in SCSL-03-01-1-1331, but the arguments made in this ground of 
appeal were found to be sufficiently discussed in other grounds of appeal.  
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military assistance to the RUF or AFRC constituted assistance to crimes”.133 The Defence 
contended that the correct question was whether or not the assistance was “to the crime, as 
such”134, i.e. the physical perpetrator, not merely to the perpetration of the crime. The De-
fence’s contention was that without this requirement, aiding and abetting liability would be to 
wide-ranging and violate principles of personal culpability.
135
 In practice, this requirement 
would necessitate that the Tribunal proved that Taylor provided assistance with the purpose of 
providing assistance to the specific crimes the RUF/AFRC committed in Sierra Leone.  
 
The Defence stated in appeal ground number 20 that the “language of ‘specifically aimed’ and 
‘specifically directed’ assists in understanding that the ‘substantial contribution’ must be to 
the criminal conduct itself”136 They held that the concept of “specific direction” supported 
their understanding that proving that the accused provided a “substantial contribution” to the 
perpetration of the crime is not sufficient to prove the actus reus of aiding and abetting.
137
 The 
Appeals Chamber discussed the elements of the actus reus of aiding and abetting to establish 
whether or not there is such an additional requirement, namely that the assistance provided 
had to be provided to the physical actor, and was used in the commission of a specific crime 
by the principal.
138
 This additional requirement suggested by the Defence is not the same as 
the “specific direction” requirement, but has some important similarities. It effectively raises 
the threshold for aiding and abetting liability and requires proof of a stronger link between the 
assistance provided and the perpetrated crime, thus limiting the scope of aiding and abetting 
liability. 
 
In order to establish the elements of the actus reus, the Appeals Chamber looked to the Statute 
of the SCSL and customary international law. Starting by interpreting Article 6(1) of the Stat-
ute in accordance with its plain meaning in context, the Chamber found that the Article estab-
lishes individual criminal liability when it comes to the accused’s relationship to the “crime”, 
not to the physical actor as such.
139
 The Chamber held that Article 6(1) of the Statute makes 
no mention of individual criminal liability for aiding and abetting a person, but rather for aid-
                                                 
133
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 354. 
134
  Taylor Appeal Brief paragraph 452 (emphasis in original).  
135
  Examples given by the Defence is that a mother would be criminally liable for feeding and housing her son, 
if her son committed a crime,  and thereby sustaining his existence, and having a substantial effect on the 
crime. The defence also held that a gun salesman would be liable for a crime committed by the buyer of a 
gun. 
136
  Taylor Appeal Brief paragraph 453. 
137
  Taylor Appeal Brief paragraph 453. 
138
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment paragraph 363. 
139
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment paragraph 366. 
25 
 
ing and abetting the perpetration of a crime.
140
 In their review of customary international law, 
the Chamber concluded that, contrary to what the Defence claimed, customary international 
law does not support the contention that the aider and abettor has to provide assistance to the 




The Appeals Chamber proceeded to review relevant case law
142
 in order to establish how aid-
ing and abetting liability has been applied in practice and found that “the essential question 
when determining whether an accused culpably assisted the commission of the crimes is the 
effect of the accused’s assistance on the commission of the crimes, not the manner in which 
such assistance was provided”.143 Regarding the Defence’s claim that the actus reus of  aiding 
and abetting liability need to be limited in order to differentiate aiding and abetting liability 
and JCE liability, the Chamber pointed out that different forms of individual criminal liability 
does not apply to different factual circumstances.
144
 The Chamber thus concluded that the 
requisite actus reus of aiding and abetting liability is that “an accused’s acts and conduct had 
a substantial effect on the commission of the crimes”, rejecting the Defence’s claim that it 




3.4.2 “Specific direction” 
The element of “specific direction” is discussed by the SCSL Appeals Chamber in the last 
part of the section establishing the law of individual criminal liability.
146
  The Defence sub-
mitted in Appeal Ground 16
147
 that the mens rea applied by the Trial Chamber, requiring 
“knowledge” was erroneous, and that “purpose”148 was the correct mens rea standard. They 
held that the “purpose” standard corresponded with the concept of “specific direction” as it 
was recognized by the ICTR/ICTY jurisprudence.
149
 The Defence proceeded to argue that the 
resemblance between the terms “specifically directed”, “specifically aimed” and “purpose” 
was evident
150
 and that a concept analogous to “ ‘purpose’ has usually been recognized in the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR”.151 
                                                 
140
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment paragraph 366. 
141
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment paragraph 368. 
142
  The Appeals Chamber review cases: Brima et al., Brđanin, Blagojević and Jokić, Krstić, Simić et al, Becker, 
Weber et al, Ministries case, Flick and the Justice case.  
143
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment paragraph 380. 
144
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  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment paragraph 385. 
146
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraphs 466-481. 
147
  Taylor Appeal Brief, paragraphs 319-397. 
148
  See The Rome Statute Article 25(3)(c) which also uses “purpose”  
149
  Taylor Appeal Case No. SCSL-03-01-A Document No. 1331 paragraph 355. 
150




The Defence suggested two different ways of understanding the “specific direction” require-
ment. One in which the mental state of the aider and abettor is considered when determining 
“specific direction”,  and a more narrow interpretation in which the accused’s intent and men-
tal state is not to be considered. Their contention was that the latter interpretation would be a 
“weak concept”.152 Against this one could argue that taking the mental state of the aider and 
abettor into consideration when trying to prove the existence of  “specific direction” would 
bring the requirement far into the territory of the mens rea of aiding and abetting.  The Prose-
cution on the other hand maintained that the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR establishes 
that “knowledge” is the mens rea standard that is required for aiding and abetting, rejecting 




The Defence did not appeal the fact that the Trial Chamber concluded that the actus reus of 
aiding and abetting does not require “specific direction”. After the Perišić Appeal Judgment 
was pronounced, both the Defence and the Prosecution sought to amend
154
 or file additional 
written submissions
155
, but both were denied
156
 by the Court. The Court added that it was 





Even though the Court rejected the motions to amend, the Appeals Chamber nonetheless dis-
cussed the “specific direction” requirement. The Chamber established that there is nothing in 
the SCSL Statute to imply that “specific direction” is an element of the actus reus of aiding 
and abetting. The question was therefore, according to the Chamber, whether or not “specific 
direction” is an element of aiding and abetting under customary international law during the 
indictment period of the Taylor case.
158
 After reviewing the post-Second World War jurispru-
dence, the ILC Draft Code and state practice, the Chamber was satisfied that none of these 
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  Taylor Appeal Brief, paragraph 358. 
152
  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 468. 
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  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 469. 
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  Defence request to amend notice of appeal SCSL-03-10-A-1383. 
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  Prosecution motion for leave to file additional written submissions regarding the ICTY Appeal Judgment in 
Perišić, SCSL-03-01-A-1381. 
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authorities called for the element of “specific direction”.159 After concluding that the “actus 
reus of aiding and abetting liability under Article 6(1) of the Statute and under customary in-
ternational law”160 is that the assistance of the aider and abettor has a “substantial effect” on 





The Appeals Chamber in Taylor contended that the Appeals Chamber in Perišić did not assert 
that “specific direction” was an element of the actus reus under customary international law. 
In only analyzing the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR
162
 on the subject, the SCSL Appeals 
Chamber presumed that the objective of the ICTY Appeals Chamber was merely to identify 
and apply a rule based on internally binding precedent.
163
 The Appeals Chamber in Taylor did 
not find the sheer persuasive value of the arguments made in favor of a “specific direction” 
requirement in Perišić to be particularly convincing. The ICTY jurisprudence is, according to 
the Taylor Appeals Chamber, lacking “a clear, detailed analysis of the authorities supporting 
the conclusion that “specific direction” is an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting 




The Taylor Appeals Chamber did not find the Perišić Appeals Chamber’s analysis of its own 
jurisprudence to be persuasive either, mentioning especially Mrkšić and Šljivančanin and 
Lukić and Lukić.165 In Mrkšić and Šljivančanin the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated, as men-
tioned above that “the Appeals Chamber has confirmed that ‘specific direction’ is not an es-
sential ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.
166
 Finally, the Taylor Appeals 
Chamber argued that the notion of “specific direction”, having to be proved beyond reasona-
ble doubt, but simultaneously beeing “implicit” or “self-evident” is counterintuitive and is not 
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  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 474. 
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  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 475. 
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  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 476. 
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  Since the ICTY and the ICTR Appeals Chamber is constituted by the same judges, the Appeals Chamber in 
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Consequently, the Chamber concluded that it found no cogent reasons to depart from the con-
tention that “specific direction” is not an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting lia-




The Perišić and Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgments sparked a debate regarding the existence 
of a discrete “specific direction” requirement in the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability. 
The SCSL Appeals Chamber addressed the question of “specific direction” as a direct re-
sponse to the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s holdings in Perišić. This form of dialogue between 
international tribunals/courts is notable, and indicates that the SCSL Appeals Chamber 
deemed it necessary to address the question of “specific direction” as a direct response to the 
Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment. In the following chapter some of the matters of conten-
tion brought to light by these two judgments will be analyzed.  
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  Taylor Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 481. 
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4 Changing the scope of aiding and abetting liability? 
4.1 Aiding and abetting liability – over- or under-inclusive? 
The debate regarding the “specific direction” requirement can be viewed as an expression of a 
more general sentiment that the threshold for applying aiding and abetting liability is too low, 
and should somehow be raised. Applying a discrete “specific direction” requirement effec-
tively raises the threshold for aiding and abetting liability, especially when applied to cases 
where the accused aider and abettor was remote from the perpetration of the crimes. One may 
argue that the sheer fact that the accused aider and abettor was remote, either temporally or 
geographically, may reduce the  probability of the assistance given by the accused actually 
having an effect on the crime, and thereby justifying the additional requirement. 
 
This prompts a number of questions with regard to aiding and abetting liability. First of all, is 
the additional ‘test’ that the specific direction requirement represents necessary, because aid-
ing and abetting liability without this requirement would have a too wide range? The defini-
tion of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability widely agreed upon until the Perišić Ap-
peal Judgment was, as mentioned above,
169
 that the assistance provided by the accused aider 
and abettor had a “substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime”.170 This ‘test’, or a simi-
lar requirement, was derived from the International Law Commission’s 1996 Draft Code171 
(ILC Draft Code).
172
  The ILC Draft Code Article 2(3)(d) states that “an individual shall be 
responsible […] if that individual: (d) knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and 
substantially”.173 The Tadić Trial Chamber Judgment adopted the same approach as the ILC 
and stated that the accused would be liable if the assistance “directly and substantially” af-




However, in the next major case applying aiding and abetting liability at the ICTY, the 
Furundžija case, the Trial Chamber stated that:  
 
“In view of this, the Trial Chamber believes the use of the term "direct" in qualifying 
the proximity of the assistance and the principal act to be misleading as it may imply 
that assistance needs to be tangible, or to have a causal effect on the crime. This may 
                                                 
169
  See chapter 2.2.3.2 on the objective e lement of aiding and abetting liability. 
170
  Furundžija Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 249. 
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  International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind with 
Commentaries, 1996. 
172
  Finnin (2012) page 127. 
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  ILC Draft Code Article 2(3)(d) (emphasis added).  
174
  Tadić Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 692. 
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explain why the word “direct” was not used in the Rome Statute’s provision on aiding 
and abetting.”175 
 
A need to limit the scope of aiding and abetting liability has been conveyed by commentators, 
and defence attorneys following the Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment. The proponents of a 
discrete “specific direction” requirement argue that aiding and abetting liability without this 
requirement ranges too wide in cases of remoteness, and consequently placing the threshold 
for liability unreasonably low. Dissenting Judge Moloto also voiced this concern by placing 
aiding and abetting liability in a different context during an exchange with Senior Trial Attor-
ney Mark Brian Harmon in closing arguments of the Perišić Trial. Judge Moloto used the war 
in Afghanistan as an example and asked Mr. Harmon if the NATO Commanders in Afghani-
stan would be guilty of aiding and abetting the alleged crimes committed in Afghanistan, 
mentioning detentions in Guantanamo, in Bagram and in Kabul as examples.
176
 This has been 
the common form of the argument presented by the proponents of a discrete “specific direc-
tion” requirement.177 
 
 The Taylor Defence presented a similar argument in their appeal brief, holding that the Trial 
Chamber’s reasoning in Taylor criminalized conduct that was regarded as lawful by States.178 
The Defence mentions US military support to Yemen in 2009/2010 “to eliminate safe havens 
for terrorist organizations”179. This took place at a time when the both the US State Depart-
ment and Human Rights Watch reported that the Yemeni air force, army and police had prob-
ably engaged in broad targeting of civilians, unlawful killings, torture and arbitrary detention. 
The Defence argued that according to the Chamber’s approach any US governmental official 
that had knowledge and decision-making capacities would be guilty of aiding and abetting 
those crimes.
180
   
 
Another argument presented by commentators is that by not limiting the scope of aiding and 
abetting liability with a specific direction requirement, it would resemble that of strict liability 
and discourage individuals and governments from getting involved or provide aid in interna-
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  Furundžija Trial Chamber Judgment, paragraph 232. 
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  The exchange can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Cfbt_mQ-rw. The analogy is presented 
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tional conflicts. For example in providing weapons and support to groups or organizations 




On the other side of the spectrum one finds those who argue that the “specific direction” re-
quirement standard is under-inclusive.
 182 Those who oppose “specific direction” as a discrete 
requirement hold that it narrows the scope of aiding and abetting liability too much, and thus 
raising the threshold for aiding and abetting liability too high. The arguments presented above 
suggest that an understanding of aiding and abetting liability that excludes “specific direction” 
would place liability where we as a society do not wish to place liability. If one looks to the 
premise of this argument one might claim that it is “mandating acceptance of the notion that 
arms trading, and particularly weapons exchanges with nations openly engaged in committing 
atrocities, is socially valuable (or at least an activity for which there is a non-criminal, lawful 
purpose).”183  
 
If we look to the example of the war in Afghanistan presented by Judge Moloto, we should 
ask ourselves if it is the moral and principle standpoint that, in a situation where a Command-
er of NATO Allied Forces is found to have made a substantial contribution to crimes commit-
ted, and it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that this commander had knowledge that the 
acts would assist in the commission of the crime, that he should not be held liable? It has been 
suggested that in order to differentiate between the cases of aiding and abetting one wish to 
include and those where the aiding and abetting liability might seem over-inclusive, one 





There is no clear answer to the question of whether aiding and abetting liability as it stands 
today is over- or under-inclusive. Maybe it is a question of finding the balance between an 
aiding and abetting liability that has a wide scope and is functional in relation to its purpose, 
and an aiding and abetting liability that has too wide of a scope as to placing liability where 
liability should not be placed. Ultimately this might be a discussion of what kind of criminal 
liability we want to have and who we think should bear the responsibility for international 
crimes. If we are to limit the scope of aiding and abetting liability, there are several ways to 
achieve this. In the following this thesis will analyze some of the practical implications of 
restricting the scope of aiding and abetting liability by applying a requirement of “specific 
direction.  
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4.2 Only in cases of remoteness? 
The Appeals Chamber in Perišić concluded as mentioned that “no conviction for aiding and 
abetting may be entered if the element of specific direction is not established beyond reasona-
ble doubt, either explicitly or implicitly”185. The Appeals Chamber viewed the “specific direc-
tion” requirement as establishing the requisite culpable link between the assistance provided 
and the crime.
186
 The Chamber went on to state that in cases where the aider and abettor is 
remote from the relevant crimes, “specific direction” cannot be proven implicitly through the 
evidence of the other elements of aiding and abetting, and therefore has to be subject to “ex-
plicit consideration”187.  
 
It is not made clear by the ICTY Appeals Chamber what the legal basis for this explicit re-
quirement in cases of remoteness is. The argument that remoteness in cases of aiding and 
abetting necessitates an explicit consideration of specific direction was introduced by Judge 
Moloto in his dissenting opinion in the Perišić Trial Chamber Judgment. He stated that: “I 
contend that in cases of remoteness, the notion of specific direction must form an integral and 
explicit component of the objective element of aiding and abetting.”188 Judge Moloto did not 
cite or refer to any sources when presenting this contention. He reasoned that if “specific di-
rection” can be “implicit in the finding that an accused has provided practical assistance to the 
principal perpetrator which had a substantial effect on the crime” this would imply that there 
needs to be established a direct link between the assistance of the aider and abettor and the 
commission of the crime. According to the Judge this link needs to be explicitly considered in 
cases of remoteness, such as the Perišić case.189 What is interesting is that this reasoning by 
the dissenting Judge Moloto is seemingly only founded on his own inferences from the case 
law of the ICTY. 
 
The Perišić Appeals Chamber does not define “remoteness” in the judgment. The only guid-
ance given by the Appeals Chamber is that it “will depend on the individual circumstances of 
each case”190It is made clear by the Appeals Chamber in Perišić that “remoteness” can be 
determined by factors such as temporal distance and geographical distance, but is not limited 
to these factors.
191
 When it comes to geographic distance as an indication of “remoteness”, the 
question is; what geographical distance is required to be considered as having been remote 
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  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 36. 
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  Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment, paragraph 37. 
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from the perpetration of the crime? Is it necessary to be in a different country than where the 
crimes are perpetrated, like Perišić and Taylor, or is a distance of 10 kilometers enough? If 
this is to be determined on a case-by-case basis it may lead to rather arbitrary conclusions on 
what constitutes “remoteness”.  
 
The prosecution in the 2014 Šainović Appeal Judgment argued that the fact that an accused 
aider and abettor who is remote from the crime may “be able to recognize a wider pattern of 
crimes or the systematic nature of crimes which he is assisting and may be able to make much 
more substantial contributions or assistance in crimes.
192
 This especially applies where the 
accused is a high-ranking official of an army, and goes to show that remoteness does not nec-
essarily go hand in hand with a lesser degree of culpability.
193
 Ventura points out that “in real-
ity, high-ranking military commanders are rarely on the front line with the soldiers when they 
carry out crimes.”194 He also points out that there is “always” some degree of geographic dis-




In a world where geographic distance is becoming less important when it comes to commit-
ting international crimes, through improved means of communication and the use of drones, 
geographic proximity may become a less potent indicator of culpability than it might have 
been in the past. If “specific direction” is a discrete requirement in aiding and abetting liabil-
ity in cases of “remoteness”, then “remoteness” should be defined, but this may prove diffi-
cult to do, and we might be referred to a case-by-case determination. This might make the 
application of a discrete “specific direction” requirement unpredictable, which is unfortunate, 
considering the foreseeability for the accused.  
 
4.3 The future of aiding and abetting liability 
The Perišić and Taylor Judgments were pronounced within the same year. Not only did they 
take different stands on the existence of the requirement of “specific direction”, but the SCSL 
Appeals Chamber did so in direct response to the findings of the ICTY Appeals Chamber. 
The Defence in Taylor had not appealed the Trial Chamber’s finding that specific direction 
was not part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.
196
 Even so, as described above, the 
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SCSL Appeals Chamber chose to discuss the subject of “specific direction”. This dialogue 
between two ICTs is interesting as it shows that the SCSL felt pressure to take a stand with 
regards to the question of “specific direction”, because one of its peer tribunals released a 
disputed judgment on the subject. Some commentators have claimed that the SCSL Appeals 
Chamber did not have to address the question of “specific direction” in Taylor. 197 Fielding 
holds that that it was unnecessary because the RUF/AFRC’s military operations were labeled 





The question of “specific direction” also became the subject of the Šainović et al. Appeals 
Chamber Judgment pronounced in January 2014. The case concerned the forcible displace-
ment of the Albanian population in Kosovo in 1999.
199
 One of the defendants, Lazarević, had 
been convicted of aiding and abetting deportation and other inhumane acts as crimes against 
humanity by the ICTY Trial Chamber.
200
 The Appeals Chamber in Šainović et al. interpreted 
the Perišić Appeal, the Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal and the Lukić and Lukić Appeal, con-
cluding that they were not compatible when it came to the issue of “specific direction”.201 The 
Appeals Chamber in Šainović et al. disagreed with the Appeals Chamber in Perišić and held 
that the Tadić Appeal Judgment did not set precedence for “specific direction”. The Šainović 
et al. Appeals Chamber concluded that “specific direction” is not an element of the actus reus 
of aiding and abetting liability.
202
 The ICTY Trial Chamber’s conviction of Lazarević for aid-





The question of “specific direction” will most likely also be the subject of the Stanišić and 
Simatović Appeal. On the 30 May 2013 the ICTY Trial Chamber acquitted Jovica Stanišić 
and Franko Simatović of aiding and abetting crimes in BiH, because “specific direction” 
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could not be proven, and it will be up to the Appeals Chamber to either confirm or overturn 
the Trial Chamber’s decision.204 
 
4.3.1 Part of the mens rea? 
If the requirement of “specific direction” is to be accepted and applied as a necessary and es-
sential element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability, it has been argued that the 
requirement would be more appropriately placed in the mens rea of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity. As mentioned above, Judges Meron and Agius presented this view in their joint separate 
opinion in the Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment. They stated that “were we setting out the 
elements of aiding and abetting outside the context of the Tribunal’s past jurisprudence, we 
would consider categorising specific direction as an element of mens rea”.205 However, since 
they view the Tribunal’s precedent to place “specific direction” in the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting liability, they did not see any “cogent reasons” to depart from the precedent of the 
Tribunal on this point.
206
 The Judges emphasized that the important thing was that “specific 
direction” establishes the necessary connection between the assistance of the aider and abettor 




The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Perišić stated that “the Appeals Chamber acknowledges that 
“specific direction” may involve considerations that are closely related to questions of mens 
rea”208 . They further stated that “evidence regarding an individual’s state of mind may serve 
as circumstantial evidence that assistance he or she facilitated was specifically directed to-
wards charged crimes”209. When the Appeals Chamber made these statements, the Chamber 
recognized the fact that deciding if assistance was “specifically directed” will entail examin-
ing the intentions of the accused aider and abettor. Intuitively, this would place the “specific 
direction” requirement in the mens rea of aiding and abetting liability. This would be prob-
lematic, considering that “knowledge” is the generally accepted mens rea standard for aiding 
and abetting.
210
 One could also argue that adding a requirement of “specific direction” to the 
mens rea of aiding and abetting would effectively transform aiding and abetting into a form of 
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principal perpetration. This could even be argued if one accepts that “specific direction” is a 
part of the actus reus, like the Appeals Chamber in Perišić did. Dissenting Judge Liu in the 
Perišić Appeal noted this when he stated that “[i]f specific direction is indeed part of the actus 
reus of aiding and abetting liability, it could be argued that there is little difference between 
aiding and abetting and certain forms of commission”.211 If aiding and abetting liability is 
developing into mode of liability similar to a form of commission, it would diminish the ap-
plicability of one of the most commonly applied modes of accessorial criminal liability in 
international criminal law.  
 
When it comes to the future of aiding and abetting liability, the Stanišić and Simatović Appeal 
will possibly provide some clarification, especially on how the ICTY Appeals Chamber views 
the question of “specific direction”. But, as mentioned above,212 the future of the “specific 
direction” requirement and aiding and abetting liability more generally will ultimately be de-
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5 Concluding remarks 
As one commentator noted after the Šainović et al. Appeal Judgment was published: “the ju-
risprudence identifying the status of CIL [customary international law] in relation to the re-
quirement of ‘specific direction’ cannot be said to have clarified the issue but rather contrib-
uted to the ‘self-fragmentation’ in international criminal law, and especially within the 
ICTY”.213 This is illustrative for the status of the requirement of “specific direction” in aiding 
and abetting liability in international criminal law today. There is no clear answer to the ques-
tion if there is such a requirement under customary international law. The discussion brought 
about by the Perišić and Taylor Appeal Judgments clearly showed this and also showed the 
fragmentation of the international criminal law as a legal discipline. The judgments also 
sparked an interesting debate regarding the scope of aiding and abetting liability more gener-
ally, and brought attention to the fact that some in the legal community of international crimi-
nal law are of the opinion that the scope of aiding and abetting liability should be restricted. 
  
As mentioned above, the question of “specific direction” will probably be brought up in the 
remaining cases applying aiding and abetting at the ad hoc tribunals, before it is eventually 
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